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ABSTRACT 
One of the fundamental aims of economic policies is to increase capital accumulation in terms of 
investment that is necessary to maintain a desirable and sustainable growth rate in the developing 
countries. The majority of empirical studies show that per capita GDP growth, foreign trade, 
capital flows, external debt, public sector borrowing requirements, inflation and interest rate 
are the main determinants of investment rate. Recently, there is an increasing emphasis on 
the role of the financial sector in this process, since a financial system, in essence, mobilizes 
saving to investment. In particular, it can be argued that a well-functioning and developed 
financial system may efficiently mobilize available resources for investment. Therefore, the aim 
of this study is to investigate whether financial development has contributed to an increase 
in investment in Turkey. To reach an empirical and firm conclusion, an investment function, 
including the traditional potential determinants along with financial development, is estimated 
by utilizing the developments in the time series econometrics in terms of unit root tests that 
allow structural breaks and co-integration for the period 1970-2009 in Turkey.
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Introduction 
Analysis of data from a large sample of countries has consistently shown that the rate of accumulation 
of physical capital is an important determinant of economic growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Until 
1980, Turkey pursued an industrialization strategy based on state-led import-substitution. Under 
this strategy the economy enjoyed rapid economic growth up to 1976. As a consequence of the rapid 
expansion of public demand and an investment boom, imports were, however, growing much more 
rapidly than exports, and the economy became increasingly dependent on foreign borrowing. From 
1977 to 1980, growth collapsed virtually to zero, inflation accelerated, and foreign debt continued 
to increase. Controls on nominal interest rates caused extreme financial depression in this period. 
Administratively imposed ceilings on deposit and lending rates, credit rationing, and excessive 
reliance of corporations on credit rather than equity finance and other direct security issues were 
common characteristics of the pre-1980 financial regime in Turkey (Atiyas and Ersel, 1995).
Investments in the Turkish economy in the period after 1970 have increased consistently. However, 
during economic crises such as 1980, 1998 and 2001, numerical increase in investment has been 
observed, but relatively the rate of growth has decreased. In the last 30-year period only in the 
previous year of 2009 has a decrease in investment occurred. This decline in investment is a matter of 
concern, given the close connection between the level of investment and the rate of economic growth 
as documented in recent studies (Ben-David, 1998; Chari, Kehoe & McGrattan, 1997; Barro, 1991; 
Khan & Reinhart, 1990; Kormendi & Meguire, 1985). It is therefore worthwhile to investigate the 
factors that determine the level of domestic investment in these countries. This paper investigates the 
role of financial factors in determining domestic investment and private investment in Turkey. The 
premise of this study is that financial development facilitates the channeling of resources from savers 
to the highest-return investment activities, increases the quantity of funds available for investment, 
and thus mitigates the liquidity constraints faced by entrepreneurs. Thus a large and liquid financial 
system reduces the overall costs and risks of investment, which stimulates capital accumulation.
The analysis is based on a reduced-form investment model that relates a country’s domestic investment 
to the level of financial development while controlling for other nonfinancial factors. Following a 
standard practice in time series analysis, the investment equation is specified as a dynamic serial 
correlation model (see Hsiao, 1986; Anderson & Hsiao, 1982, 1981). To test the effects of financial 
development on investment, four indicators are used alternatively: credit to the private sector, 
total liquid liabilities of financial intermediaries, credit provided by banks, and a composite index 
combining these three indicators.
Theoretical Approaches
Despite the remarkable attention devoted to investment behavior, the literature has not yet produced 
a full-fledged model of investment applicable to the context of developing countries. Conventional 
models such as the flexible accelerator proved quite successful in explaining aggregate investment 
in industrial countries.  The main underlying assumptions of these models, however (such as the 
assumption of perfect capital markets, absence of liquidity constraints, and abstraction from the role 
of government), are highly questionable in the context of developing economies. Research in the 
85Volume 1    Number 1    January 2011
Financial Determinants of Investment for Turkey
past decades has shifted attention toward the role of financial factors in explaining investment over 
time and across countries. Studies that emphasize the role of financial determinants for investment 
in developing countries have revived the original ideas of Schumpeter (1932) about the importance 
of the financial system in promoting technological progress. These studies also embed the Keynesian 
view that the ``state of credit’’ is an important determinant of investment (Keynes, 1937, 1973).
Gurley and Shaw (1955) provided vital impetus to the Schumpeterian and Keynesian insights 
by tying economic growth directly to financial development. Gurley and Shaw suggested that 
“economic development is retarded if only self-finance and direct finance are accessible, if financial 
intermediaries do not evolve” (Gurley & Shaw, 1955, pp. 518-519). One key difference between 
developed and underdeveloped countries, as Gurley and Shaw argued, is the level of organization 
and sophistication of financial intermediaries, especially because of their role in facilitating the flow 
of loanable funds between savers and investors.
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) offered a theoretical and empirical foundation for the relationship 
between monetary factors and investment. These authors advanced the hypothesis that investment 
in developing countries is positively associated with the accumulation of real money balances. The 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis is based on the assumption that limited access to credit in developing 
countries forces investors to accumulate enough real balances before they can initiate investment 
projects. This view establishes a positive relationship between real interest rate and investment. 
Higher interest rates on deposits attract more real balances, which allow them to finance more 
investment. This contradicts the neoclassical view that higher interest rates increase the user cost of 
capital and thus reduce investment. Evidence for this neoclassical interest rate (relative price) effect 
is mixed at best. Recent studies go beyond the McKinnon- Shaw tradition and relate investment to 
financial development in general by emphasizing the special services that financial intermediaries 
provide to investors. The financial system is the key to matching financial resources to investors’ 
needs both through short-term credit expansion and, through its maturity transformation function, 
by channeling saving into long-term credit markets. Financial markets play an important role in 
allocating investment capital to high return activities (Greenwood & Smith, 1997).
Financial intermediaries have a special function in alleviating information problems, reducing 
liquidity risk, reducing monitoring costs, and channeling credit to certain classes of borrowers that 
cannot access nonintermediated forms of credit (Levine, 1997).
This analysis implies that low investment in developing countries may be due to low financial 
intermediation characterized by a limited range of financial instruments, limited long-term lending, 
inefficient lending practices (for example, politically motivated lending), direct credit control, and 
crowding out of private investment by public borrowing for consumption purposes. The emphasis 
on the role of finance for investment constitutes a major improvement on the traditional view that 
domestic investment is primarily determined by domestic saving. This traditional view holds that the 
level of saving determines the interest rate and thus the cost of investment, which in turn influences 
the demand for new capital. Indeed, a number of studies have documented a close connection 
between low investment rates in developing economies and low domestic saving (Bayoumi, 1990; 
Dooley, Frankel & Mathieson, 1987; Feldstein & Horioka, 1980). These studies find that countries 
with low saving rates also have low investment rates. The positive relationship between domestic 
saving and domestic investment is often viewed as evidence of imperfect international capital flows 
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and various country-specific institutional and noninstitutional rigidities (see Feldstein & Horioka, 
1980). However, this approach, that assumes that saving directly causes investment, has important 
limitations. First, this view is an equilibrium (static) approach. Second, this view only considers the 
real side of the saving behavior and regards saving as a residue of income after consumption.
As some authors argue, it is more appropriate to consider saving as a financial phenomenon. Under 
this view, saving is regarded as a mechanism of supply of funds (directly and indirectly) to the capital 
markets that channel the funds into the investment process. In that sense, the financial sector benefits 
from positive externalities from the real sector through the volume of saving. This approach implies 
an important role of the financial system in the determination of the level of investment.
Empirical studies have shown that a number of nonfinancial factors also affect domestic investment 
in developing countries. This paper pays particular attention to three categories of factors: factors 
hypothesized by conventional investment theory (output growth and interest rate); factors related 
to government policy (government consumption, government borrowing, and inflation); and open-
economy factors (trade flows, foreign debt, and black market activities).
Neoclassical investment theory suggests that the growth rate of real output is positively related to 
investment because it indicates changes in aggregate demand for output that investors seek to meet. 
Empirical evidence is consistent with this accelerator effect and shows that high output growth is 
associated with high investment rates (Fielding, 1997, 1993; Greene & Villanueva, 1991; Wai & 
Wong, 1982). Empirical tests have been less successful in establishing a robust negative relationship 
between the interest rate and investment. Neoclassical theory suggests that high interest rates raise 
the cost of capital, which reduces the investment rate.
Government policies affect domestic investment through various channels, too. The first is 
that government consumption spending may crowd out domestic investment by raising interest 
rates, by reducing the pool of funds in the markets, and by increasing distortionary taxation on 
investment activities. It is also possible, however, for government spending to “crowd in” domestic 
investment through the accelerator channel. The net effect is theoretically unpredictable; it can only 
be determined empirically. Government borrowing from the domestic financial system is another 
factor that can reduce investment.
Fischer (1993, p. 487) argues that the inflation rate serves as an indicator of the overall ability of 
the government to manage the economy. Since there are no good arguments for very high rates 
of inflation, a government that is producing high inflation is a government that has lost control. 
Evidently, there is little incentive to invest in a country where the government has lost control over 
the macroeconomic environment.
Trade flows, external debt, and black market activities also affect the rate of investment in sub-Saharan 
African economies. Empirical evidence shows that among the many measures of openness, the flow 
of trade (imports and exports) appears to have the most consistent relationship with investment. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) find that a positive relationship between investment and trade holds 
whether trade flows are measured by imports, exports or total trade (imports plus exports). Studies on 
developing countries in general in particular find a negative relationship between external debt and 
domestic investment (Jenkins, 1998; Greene & Villanueva, 1991). High debt can depress investment 
in various ways. First, high debt implies that a higher proportion of domestic output is used to 
meet debt obligations. This phenomenon, referred to as “debt overhang” (Krugman, 1988), creates 
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a disincentive effect that discourages domestic investment. Second, high debt obligations adversely 
affect the country’s position in international credit markets and can even cause credit rationing. The 
credit rationing effect can be important. Credit rationing thus amplifies the debt overhang effect 
in reducing domestic investment. Third, high levels of external debt depress investment by making 
the macroeconomic environment more uncertain. Chronic trade deficits combined with ill-advised 
monetary and exchange policies have created a shortage of foreign Exchange. This and other factors 
have caused black market activities to flourish. High black market premia tend to induce domestic 
investors to substitute foreign currency hoarding for investment in physical capital. In addition, black 
market premia may simply be a symptom of overvaluation of national currencies. This by itself can 
depress investment by reducing foreign demand for domestic products. Black market premia can also 
be a sign of pervasive price distortions in the economy that adversely affect investment.
Love and Zicchino (2006)  applied vector auto regression (VAR) to firm-level panel data from 36 
countries to study the dynamic relationship between firms’ financial conditions and investment by 
using orthogonalized impulse-response functions in order to separate the ‘fundamental factors’ from 
the ‘financial factors.’ They found that the impact of financial factors on investment, which indicates 
the severity of financing constraints, is significantly larger in countries with less developed financial 
systems. Their finding emphasizes the role of financial development in improving capital allocation 
and growth and shows that the availability of internal funds is more important in explaining 
investment in countries with less developed financial systems. Furthermore, the impact of a positive 
shock to cash flow on investment was significantly higher in countries with a ‘low’ level of financial 
development than in countries with a ‘high’ level of financial development and they found that 
positive shock to marginal productivity has less impact on investment of firms in countries with low 
levels of financial development.
Saumitra N. Bhaduri (2005) investigated the impact of financial liberalization on the investment 
patterns in a developing economy, India. The empirical findings revealed mixed evidence in favor of 
the hypothesis that the liberalization effort has succeeded in relaxing financial constraint faced by the 
Indian firms.  The sample set consisted of a composite and heterogeneous mix of 362 firms whose 
annual accounts were reported without any gap for the financial years 1989–1990 to 1994–1995. 
The small and young firms in the sample experienced a significant increase in financial constraint in 
the post-liberalization period.
Koo and Maeng (2005) found that firstly, financial liberalization significantly reduced the financial 
constraints confronted by firms. Secondly, the effect of financial liberalization on financial constraints 
was stronger for small and non-chaebol firms than large and chaebol firms. This suggested that 
various liberalization policies implemented in financial markets helped firms to get wider access to 
external finance. This paper investigated whether financial liberalization affected firms’ investments in 
Korea. They tested for the hypothesis that financial liberalization had an impact on firms’ investment 
behavior.
Scaperlanda and Laurence (1969) studied, by employing the least-squares multiple regression 
technique, the empirical data from the 1952-66 periods related to U.S. direct investment in the 
European Economic Community (E.E.C.). While the primary orientation of this study was to 
evaluate statistically the determinants of direct foreign investment, the findings also have a bearing on 
the effect of the E.E.C. on the patterns of U.S. direct investment. No statistical evidence was found in 
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support of the tariff-discrimination hypothesis and while the relationship between the size of market 
variable and U.S. direct investment appeared to have been somewhat affected by the establishment 
of the E.E.C., the stability of the market-size elasticity between the pre- and post-E.E.C. periods 
indicated that the E.E.C. has had little impact on the sensitivity of I to changes in Y.
Günçavdı and Bleaney (2005) tested for shifts in aggregate private investment functions for Turkey 
as a consequence of financial liberalization in the early 1980s.  Results for a neoclassical model in 
error correction form suggested that the short-run dynamics of investment were altered by financial 
liberalization, with reduced sensitivity to the availability of credit, but with no evidence of increased 
sensitivity to the cost of capital. Estimation of an Euler equation model indicated that credit 
constraints remained binding after liberalization. They interpreted this as evidence of significant 
structural change to private investment functions after financial liberalization, but with credit 
constraints continuing to operate. They attempted to estimate the impact of financial liberalization 
on the dynamics of private investment in Turkey by using an error correction version of the standard 
neoclassical model and also by an Euler equation approach based on the first-order conditions for 
dynamic profit maximization. In both cases, the results were limited by the use of aggregate data 
but it was important to test to what extent aggregate investment equations were liable to structural 
change under financial liberalization.
In the case of the error-correction model, they were able to find statistically significant evidence 
of structural change. Credit variables became much less important after liberalization, as expected, 
although cost variables did not become more important. The Euler equation model, on the other 
hand, displayed no significant structural break associated with financial liberalization. The results 
for the Euler equation model suggested that credit constraints were binding both before and after 
liberalization, which would explain why this model does not display structural instability, since the 
specification depends only on whether the constraint is binding (Güncavdı, Bleaney, 2005, 445;452).
Ndikumana (2006) investigated the effects of financial development on domestic investment in a 
sample of 30 sub-Saharan African countries. It was based on a dynamic serial-correlation investment 
model including various indicators of financial development, controlling for country-specific fixed 
effects and nonfinancial factors of investment. The results indicated a positive relationship between 
domestic investment (total investment and private investment) and various indicators of financial 
development. Higher financial development led to higher future levels of investment, implying a 
potent long-run effect of financial development on domestic investment. The findings implied that 
financial development could stimulate economic growth through capital accumulation.
Ang (2009) suggested that significant directed credit programs favoring certain priority sectors 
tended to discourage private capital formation in both countries. Interest rate controls appeared to 
have a positive impact on private investment, with the effect being more pronounced in Malaysia. 
While high reserve and liquidity requirements exerted a negative influence on private investment in 
India, the effect was found to be positive in Malaysia. The empirical evidence showed a significant 
steady-state relationship between private investment and its determinants. The results suggested 
that financial repressionist policies, in the form of significant directed credit controls, appear to 
have retarded private investment in both India and Malaysia. However, contrary to the financial 
liberalization thesis, interest rate restraints appeared to be an effective device in stimulating private 
investment in both countries. While high reserve and liquidity requirements tended to have an 
89Volume 1    Number 1    January 2011
Financial Determinants of Investment for Turkey
undesirable effect on private investment in India, they were found to be favorable in Malaysia. 
Malaysia had lower corruption and better law and order compared to India. In sum, their results 
tended to support the proposition that some form of financial restraint might have stimulated private 
investment.
Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2008) examined patterns and determinants of private investment in 
an attempt to understand why levels of private investment in South East Asia have not yet fully 
recovered, using Thailand as a case study. The private investment equation was estimated during the 
period 1960–2005. They found that it was capital fund shortages rather than existing spare capacity 
that hindered short-run investment recovery. In the long run, policy emphasis should have been on 
promoting a conducive investment climate. The key finding was that private investment in Thailand 
had borne the brunt of aggregate demand contraction since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997. Among the short-run investments, credit shortage was the most important constraint on 
investment recovery following the crisis. In the long run, private investment was mostly determined 
by business opportunities and investment costs.
Spiegel (2000) indicated that financial development positively influenced both rates of investment 
and total factor productivity growth. In summary, they found that different aspects of financial 
development had positive influences on total factor productivity growth and rates of factor 
accumulation. While the ratio of private-sector liabilities to income had a fairly robust impact on total 
factor productivity growth, it entered with its predicted sign only in the accumulation of physical 
capital, and even then the performance of that variable was not robust to the inclusion of country 
fixed effects. The indicator of liquid liabilities as a share of income performs similarly, although it was 
not as robust to the inclusion of fixed effects as the private liabilities ratio in the growth equations.
Morck et al. (1990) tried to question how the stock market affected investment. For their analysis, 
they investigated the effect of stock returns and the growth in fundamental variables on investment 
growth in order to see how important the stock market was after controlling for fundamentals. 
The firm-level regressions showed that movements in relative share prices were associated with fairly 
large and statistically significant investment changes when fundamentals were held constant, but 
the incremental R2 from relative stock returns was fairly small. The cross-sectional variability of 
investment was sufficiently large that relative stock returns could account for only a small part of 
it. They argued that the explanatory power of relative stock returns for investment was unlikely to 
be evidence that the stock market provided new information to managers, since managers probably 
learned little from the market about their own firms’ idiosyncratic prospects. They also provided 
evidence that the relation between relative stock returns and investment was not driven by the 
costs of external financing. The explanatory power of relative stock returns for investment might be 
evidence of the market exerting pressure on managers, although it also seemed likely that the market 
was picking up the effect of imperfectly measured fundamentals.
Gordon (1964) presented the results of empirical work undertaken to test the theory’s ability to 
explain the annual investment of the firm. 23 large chemical corporations were selected and data was 
obtained to provide the value of each variable for the years 1954 through 1960, thereby providing 
161 observations on each variable. This study’s conclusions might be summarized as follows: First, 
a large proportion of the scale deflated variation in investment in the sample was explained by the 
security flow variable, the investment consistent with maintaining a satisfactory level of security made 
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possible by the period’s operations. Second, the correlation with the profitability variable was quite 
small. While this might be due to lack of influence on the level of investment, it was quite possible 
that the cause was the limitations of the change in sales as a measure of rate of return on investment.
Methodology
Let us first define d to be the degree of integration of a time series At. More precisely, if At achieves 
stationary after being differenced d times, it is said to be integrated of order d, denoted by At ~ I(d). 
Thus, an I(1) variable is a variable that achieves stationarity after being differenced one.
A necessary condition for testing for a long-run relationship between two or more variables is that 
these variables are I(1), i. e., stationary in first differences.  We, therefore, first test for a unit root 
using the conventional unit root tests such as ADF (see Dickey and Fuller, 1981; Said and Dickey, 
1984) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin, 1992) tests. Besides, in order to capture any 
possible structural shift over the estimation period, we also employ Perron (1997).  This test allow 
for a single break at an unknown time under the alternative hypothesis of trend-stationarity. While 
it is true that the Perron (1997) test, by virtue of accounting for one structural break, is an advance 
over standard ADF and KPSS tests, it is argued that the Perron test may lose power when confronted 
with two or more breaks (see Lee and Strazicich, 2003). To address this problem, there is a procedure 
devised by LS (2003) which proposes a model that tests endogenously for two or more structural 
breaks.
If the examined series for the given country are deemed to be I(1), the next step is to establish 
whether they are cointegrated or not. To this end, we relied on the Johansen & Juselius (1990) co-
integration test.  If the series are not cointegrated we follow with the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
model. The VAR model, recently, is one of the most used time series analysis. The VAR model 
is flexible, easy to estimate, and it usually gives a good fit to macroeconomic data. However, the 
possibility of combining long-run and short-run information in the data by exploiting the co-
integration property is probably the most important reason why the VAR model continues to receive 
the interest of both econometricians and applied economists. Since, there is no constraint in the 
VAR approach and it gives dynamic relations between the variables, it is used more for the time 
series (Keating, 1990:453-454). One of the advantages of the VAR approach is that variables are 
endogenously determined.  Secondly, the VAR approach allows the variables depending more than 
white noise terms or lag of variables. Thus VAR model becomes more flexible than AR models and 
since the VAR approach includes most properties of data, it offers a strong structure. Moreover, every 
equation may be solved by OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) because there is no simultaneous terms 
right side of the equation. As Sims (1980) claims, huge scaled structural models fail to forecast out of 
sample estimation (Brooks, 2008:291; Greene, 1993:553).
Simply, as y1t and y2t are the variables, the VAR model can be defined as follows (Brooks, 2008:290):
(1)
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Current values of variables depend on the k lag of the variables and error terms. Here it is white 
noise error term and while i=1,2 E (uit) =0 ve E (u1tu2t)=0. The assumption of uncorrelated error 
terms with their lagged values makes no constriction to the VAR model. The reason for this is that 
by increasing the lag length of the variables autocorrelation problem is achieved (Güloğlu ve Özgen, 
2004:96). Lag length is determined by Akaiki Information Criteria (AIC), Schwarz Information 
Criteria (SIC), Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria (HQ) and Final Prediction Error (FPE). All 
variables have to be stationary in the VAR approach. But, Sims (1980) and Sims, Stock and Watson 
(1990) claim that whether variables have unit root or not, differencing procedure needs not to be 
applied. When differencing procedure is applied, long-run relationship between the variables can be 
lost (Enders, 2004:270). On the other hand, Fuller (1976) asserts that differencing a series doesn’t 
show an asymptotic efficiency (Günçavdı et al., 2000: 160). Thus, if the series are not cointegrated, 
VAR approach is used with differencing I(1) variables. In this paper we use both Sims and Fullers 
approach, and then we write the best one that explains the economic theory. To interpret the VAR 
results impulse-response function, variance decomposition and granger causality are used.
Data and Formation of Variables
All data are gathered from International Financial Statistics online services reported by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This publication has annual data for Turkey from 1970 to 
2009. The variables used in this paper are:
Total gross domestic investment as a percentage of gross domestic products (GDP) : It
Private domestic investment as a percentage of GDP: PIt
Real per capita gross domestic product : PGDPt
Growth rate of GDP deflator (Inflation) : Inft
Discount rate (real interest rate): r
Financial development indicators (see Ndikumana, 2000; Levine, 1997; Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1996; Lynch, 1996 for a discussion of measuring the items of financial 
development). By following Ndikumana (2000),
Total credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (FD1)
The ratio of broad money to GDP is used as a measure of size of the financial sector (FD2)
The relative importance of banks in the supply of credit is measured by total domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP (FD3)
Claims on government as a percentage of GDP (FD4)
A composite index of financial development (FDindex)
The formula for the FDindex that is developed by Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1996) is adapted to 
our paper as the following:
(1)
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where FDi is an indicator of financial development,       is the sample mean of indicator i. Since 
we have four financial development indicators, we use 4 for the maximum number of total 
symbol.
In this paper, we create two main models dealing with It and PIt. In these models besides real interest 
rate (r), real per capita gross domestic product (PGDPt), inflation (inf );  financial development 
indicators are changed to each other to see their individual effect on It and PIt, i.e.:
Empirical Results
Unit root test results
To start with the ADF and KPSS tests were applied both on levels and on the first differences of It, 
PIt, PGDPt, Inft, r, FD1, FD2, FD3, FD4 and FDindex. The results are summarized in Table 1.
The tests on the level series (Table 1) unequivocally indicate that all variable are non-stationary for 
the ADF but KPSS test indicates that PIt, FD1, FD2, FD4 and FDindex are stationary. In first 
differences, except Inft and FD2 with KPSS test, all variables are stationary.
Table 1. ADF and KPSS Unit-root Test Results
 ADF KPSS 
Level First Difference Level 
First 
Difference 
Variables tψ tψ tψ tψ
It -2,028 -6,517(*) 0,157 0,053
PIt -1,410 -4,592(*) 0,109 0,065 
PGDPt -4,274 -7,519(*) 0,768 0,118
r -0,021 -5,697(*) 0,175 0,112 
Inft -0,729 -6,141(*) 0,179 0,170 
FD1 -2,287 -4,907(*) 0,100 0,133
FD2 -3,337 -8,246(*) 0,135 0,500 
FD3 -1,154 -4,800(*) 0,148 0,076
FD4 -2,608 -6,854(*) 0,083 0,053 
FDindex -1,699 -5,546(*) 0,120 0,056
Critical 
Values 
%1 -4,211 -4,211 0,216 0,216 
%5 -3,529 -3,529 0,146 0,146 
%10 -3,196 -3,196 0,119 0,119 
Note: All regression variables are in logarithm. Asterisks *, **, ***, show 
significance of 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The critical values are 
obtained from MacKinnon (1991) for the ADF test and from Kwiatkowski et 
al. (1992) for the KPSS test. ADF test examines the null hypothesis of a unit 
root against the stationary alternative. KPSS tests the stationarity null 
hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis of a unit root. 
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I.e., Since ADF and KPSS tests are in conflict, as we emphasize in the methodology part, there may 
be structural breaks. So we apply Perron and LS unit root tests to see more accurate results. Perron 
(1997) and Lee-Strazicich (2003) tests indicate that regime shifts in all the variables.
 Table 2. Perron  and LS Unit-root Test Results
The results of Perron and LS unit root tests presented in Table 2 provide further evidence of the 
existence of a unit root when breaks are allowed. The estimated results of unit root tests indicate 
that all variables are I(1) as the null hypothesis of non-stationary can not be rejected at conventional 
significance levels.
Co-integration test results
Since it is agreed that all variables are I(1), we start to investigate whether there is a long run relation 
between the variables in Model A and B. Table 3 shows the co-integration relation of (total gross 
domestic investment as a percentage of gross domestic products) It with financial development 
indicators and a list of control variables consisting of inflation, growth rate of real per capita GDP 
and real interest rate.
 
 Perron(1997) LS(2003) 
Level First Difference Level First Difference 
Variables TB tψ TB tψ TB tψ TB tψ 
It 1997 -4,83 2002 -7,54* 1997DT -3,97 2005DT -7,78* 
PIt 1991 -5,52** 2002 -5,23 2000D -3,69 1996DT 2002DT -6,52* 
PGDPt 1996 -5,81* 1997 -9,03* 1983DT -4,58 1996DT -8,42* 
Inft 1992 -3,57 1980 -6,74* 1999DT -4,53 1979DT 1982DT -7,91* 
r 1986 -2,46 1979 -7,58* 1981DT 2004DT -4,04 1978DT -7,32* 
FD1 2006 -5,10 1996 -7,06* 1998D 2005DT -5,91 
1994DT 
1994D -5,90* 
FD2 2007 -4,57 2008 -4,16 1987DT -5,17 1979DT -9,10* 
FD3 1987 -4,48 2000 -5,20 1986DT 1992DT -4,74 1990D -6,00* 
FD4 1989 -4,42 1989 -10,65* 1987DT 1991DT -4,61 
1989D 
1992DT -11,39* 
FDindex 1987 -4,52 1989 -6,34* ----- -4,04 1985D -6,33* 
Critical 
Values 
%1 -6,32 -6,32 -6,28 -6,28 
%5 -5,59 -5,59 -5,62 -5,62 
%10 -5,29 -5,29 -5,24 -5,24 
Note: All regression variables are in logarithm. Asterisks *, **, ***, show significance of 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. TB shows the structural break time. D is dummy variable and DT is trend dummy. 
The critical values are obtained from Perron (1997) for the Perron test and from Lee and Strazicich (2003, 
2004) for the LS test. Perron and LS tests examine the null hypothesis of a unit root against the stationary 
alternative. 
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Table 3. Johansen Co integration Results Where r=Number of Co-integrating Vectors for 
Model A
Table 4 shows the co-integration relation of (private domestic investment as a percentage of GDP) 
PIt with financial development indicators and a list of control variables consisting of inflation, growth 
rate of real per capita GDP and real interest rate.
Table 4. Johansen Co-integration Results Where r=Number of Co-integrating Vectors for 
Model B
Thus, since series are not co-integrated in both Table 3 and Table 4, the VAR approach is used with 
differencing all I(1) variables to make them stationary.
 
Variables in Co-
integrating Vector Null Alternative 
Trace %95 
Critical 
Value 
max 
 %95 
Critical 
Value 1 lag 1 lag 
Model with FD1 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
69,98 
42,31 
69,81 
47,85 
27,67 
24,47 
33,87 
27,58 
Model with FD2 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
62,19 
40,19 
69,81 
47,85 
21,99 
17,79 
33,87 
27,58 
Model with FD3 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
64,01 
39,46 
69,81 
47,85 
24,55 
17,84 
33,87 
27,58 
Model with FD4 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
59,99 
30,87 
69,81 
47,85 
29,12 
12,12 
33,87 
27,58 
Model with FDindex 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
60,82 
36,99 
69,81 
47,85 
23,83 
15,06 
33,87 
27,58 
 
Variables in Co-
integrating Vector Null Alternative 
Trace %95 
Critical 
Value 
max 
 %95 
Critical 
Value 1 lag 1 lag 
Model with FD1 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
65,84 
39,63 
69,81 
47,85 
26,21 
21,30 
33,87 
27,58 
Model with FD2 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
65,15 
39,98 
69,81 
47,85 
25,17 
18,68 
33,87 
27,58 
Model with FD3 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
66,41 
42,87 
69,81 
47,85 
23,53 
21,69 
33,87 
27,58 
Model with FD4 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
57,10 
33,53 
69,81 
47,85 
23,56 
16,10 
33,87 
27,58 
Model with FDindex 0r   
1r   
1r   
2r 
62,99 
41,01 
69,81 
47,85 
21,98 
20,26 
33,87 
27,58 
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Variance Decomposition Results
Model A
Here, for all models, total gross domestic investment is affected by itself along all 10 periods time. 
Especially, Model A-FD1 analysis shows that relative to the other models at the end of 10th period 
effect of total credit to private sector (FD1) is evidently determined (See Appendix-i (Model A)).
Model B
At the end of the 10th period private domestic investment, for all models, is affected from inflation 
and real interest rate variables as a percentage of 30% (See Appendix-i (Model B)). Especially, in 
the model with FD3 (domestic credit provided by the banking sector), relative to other financial 
development items, at the end of 10th period domestic credit’s effect is higher on private domestic 
investment (See Appendix-i (Model B-FD3)).
Impulse Response Analysis
Impulse response functions describe how the economy reacts over time to exogenous impulses, which 
economists usually call ‘shocks’, and are often modeled in the context of a vector auto-regression. 
Impulse response functions describe the reaction of endogenous macroeconomic variables at the time 
of the shock and over subsequent points in time. Impulse Response Analysis results are given in the 
appendix-ii by graphs. We investigate the dynamic responses of variables against one unit standard 
error shocks to the other variables. While dotted lines show the significance bounds, straight line 
gives the estimates.
Model A
Against the effect of an exogenous shock or innovation in FD1, FD3, and FD4 there exists a positive 
effect on the total investment in the short term and then at the end of 10th period total investment 
tends to its mean value. Against the effect of an exogenous shock in FD2 there exists a negative effect 
on the total domestic investment. As a total effect of financial development items we can analyze 
the effect of a shock in FDindex. As a result of this a positive effect also occurs on total domestic 
investment (It) in the short term but It again tends to its mean at the end of the 10th period. On 
the other hand, as an impact to the effect of an exogenous shock in control variables (inflation, real 
interest rate and real per capita GDP), a negative effect occurs on the total domestic investment in 
the short term.
Model B
Against the effect of an exogenous shock or innovation in FD1,FD2, and FD4 there exists a positive 
effect on the private investment in the short term and then at the end of the 10th period private 
investment tends to its mean value. As an impact to the effect of an exogenous shock in FD3 there 
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exists a negative effect on the private domestic investment. As a total effect of financial development 
items we can analyze the effect of a shock in FDindex. As a result of this a positive effect also occurs 
on private domestic investment (It) in the short term but It again tends to its mean at the end of 
10th period.
On the other hand, against to the effect of an exogenous shock in inflation and real interest rate, there 
exists a negative effect on the private domestic investment. But, after an effect of an exogenous shock 
in real per capita GDP, there exists a positive effect on private investment.
Granger Causality Results
The term causality suggests a cause and effect relationship between two sets of variables. Table 5 
shows the Granger Causality results of Model A with FD1.
Model A
Table 5. Model A with FD1
In the Table 5 it is seen that total credit to the private sector (FD1) may Granger-cause total gross 
domestic investment. Since no other Granger cause is found, other tables are given in the appendix-
iii.
Model B
Here, inflation and real interest rate may Granger-cause private domestic investment for all Granger 
causality results for model B. On the other hand, there is not any significant Granger cause between 
the other variables (See appendix-iii (Model B))
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNI 37  1.00114  0.37868
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  1.84336  0.17470
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNI 37  0.74486  0.48285
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DR  0.18083  0.83542
  DLNFD1 does not Granger Cause DLNI 37  4.48833  0.01913
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNFD1  0.60694  0.55117
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNI 37  0.78625  0.46415
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  1.96594  0.15657
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Conclusion
The study is based on Turkish data from 1970 to 2009. The results mainly indicate a positive 
relationship between total domestic investment and all four indicators of financial development as 
we create a composite index of financial development items. The results are qualitatively similar 
for total domestic investment and private investment, with stronger effects of financial factors on 
private investment than on total domestic investment. The findings also suggest that high financial 
development is a predictor of future levels of domestic investment. Higher financial development in 
the 1980s is associated with higher investment levels in the 1990s and 2000s. The results also confirm 
stylized facts for other determinants of investment. Inflation and real interest rate negatively affect 
total domestic investment. Domestic investment, however, is negatively affected by real per capita 
GDP growth (accelerator effect). On the other hand, private investment is positively affected by real 
per capita GDP growth.
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Appendix-i
MODEL A Variance Decomposition Tables
Variance Decomposition of DLNI:Model A-FD1
 Period S.E. DLNI DLNFD1 DLNINF DLNPGDP DR
 1  0.108189  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.114674  91.31028  4.141264  0.614225  0.982688  2.951546
 3  0.116760  88.10730  4.600590  3.056185  0.962059  3.273865
 4  0.117296  87.56561  4.802083  3.037059  1.091725  3.503523
 5  0.117427  87.37640  4.845550  3.127242  1.091581  3.559228
 6  0.117456  87.34178  4.843689  3.160769  1.094995  3.558767
 7  0.117465  87.33265  4.849448  3.161032  1.096584  3.560289
 8  0.117468  87.32892  4.850649  3.162232  1.096610  3.561588
 9  0.117468  87.32812  4.850598  3.163013  1.096644  3.561628
 10  0.117468  87.32794  4.850696  3.163040  1.096680  3.561647
 Variance Decomposition of DLNI:Model A-FD2
 Period S.E. DLNI DLNINF DLNPGDP DR DLNFD2
 1  0.108458  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.115583  90.72336  2.729410  3.081509  3.400433  0.065293
 3  0.117364  88.51779  3.847332  3.520241  3.662834  0.451802
 4  0.117540  88.43920  3.842494  3.530372  3.721340  0.466594
 5  0.117549  88.42730  3.852711  3.529824  3.723527  0.466635
 6  0.117552  88.42511  3.854248  3.529811  3.723440  0.467393
 7  0.117553  88.42507  3.854273  3.529792  3.723418  0.467443
 8  0.117553  88.42506  3.854279  3.529793  3.723430  0.467443
 9  0.117553  88.42505  3.854284  3.529793  3.723431  0.467444
 10  0.117553  88.42505  3.854284  3.529793  3.723431  0.467444
 Variance Decomposition of DLNI: Model A-FD3
 Period S.E. DLNI DLNINF DLNPGDP DR DLNFD3
 1  0.108065  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.115639  89.56568  3.279691  3.311463  3.312430  0.530732
 3  0.116991  87.60536  4.342173  3.892787  3.398263  0.761415
 4  0.117374  87.10785  4.333262  3.910996  3.517622  1.130270
 5  0.117446  87.01222  4.388973  3.910662  3.516091  1.172049
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 6  0.117453  87.00204  4.391217  3.912851  3.520461  1.173432
 7  0.117453  87.00186  4.391203  3.912857  3.520542  1.173535
 8  0.117453  87.00182  4.391203  3.912859  3.520550  1.173564
 9  0.117453  87.00181  4.391203  3.912859  3.520550  1.173576
 10  0.117453  87.00181  4.391203  3.912859  3.520550  1.173580
 Variance Decomposition of DLNI: Model A-FD4
 Period S.E. DLNI DLNINF DLNPGDP DR DLNFD4
 1  0.108420  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.115961  89.84121  3.438107  3.219958  3.360777  0.139953
 3  0.117277  88.01535  4.623120  3.656558  3.555080  0.149895
 4  0.117396  87.85444  4.616059  3.655720  3.704141  0.169644
 5  0.117410  87.83481  4.628621  3.658869  3.708052  0.169644
 6  0.117412  87.83338  4.629506  3.659176  3.708235  0.169705
 7  0.117412  87.83337  4.629501  3.659171  3.708251  0.169706
 8  0.117412  87.83335  4.629511  3.659171  3.708257  0.169706
 9  0.117412  87.83335  4.629513  3.659171  3.708257  0.169706
 10  0.117412  87.83335  4.629513  3.659171  3.708258  0.169706
 Variance Decomposition of DLNI: Model A -FDindex
 Period S.E. DLNI DLNINF DLNPGDP DR
 1  0.107382  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.115634  88.22844  3.415930  3.567548  3.338606  1.449480
 3  0.116954  86.28256  4.611005  4.194833  3.307889  1.603709
 4  0.117296  85.89115  4.591966  4.224296  3.413893  1.878697
 5  0.117336  85.84443  4.617251  4.221599  3.425451  1.891273
 6  0.117341  85.83787  4.616976  4.225583  3.428218  1.891353
 7  0.117341  85.83779  4.616990  4.225597  3.428222  1.891399
 8  0.117341  85.83778  4.616989  4.225599  3.428231  1.891403
 9  0.117341  85.83777  4.616989  4.225602  3.428232  1.891406
 10  0.117341  85.83777  4.616989  4.225602  3.428232  1.891407
 
MODEL B Variance Decomposition Tables
 
Variance Decomposition of DLNPI: Model B-FD1
 Period S.E. DLNPI DLNFD1 DLNINF DLNPGDP DR
DLNFDINDEX
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 1  0.111704  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.131884  72.90510  0.361952  11.97497  0.144374  14.61360
 3  0.137132  68.00580  0.997606  16.18442  0.608559  14.20362
 4  0.138684  67.20303  1.899030  15.85363  1.005528  14.03878
 5  0.139195  66.76867  2.102646  15.95689  1.002418  14.16937
 6  0.139354  66.64278  2.097979  16.05452  1.019089  14.18564
 7  0.139404  66.62735  2.116462  16.04905  1.030832  14.17631
 8  0.139424  66.61298  2.124081  16.05042  1.031342  14.18118
 9  0.139430  66.60742  2.123991  16.05463  1.031667  14.18229
 10  0.139432  66.60673  2.124521  16.05470  1.032140  14.18191
 
Variance Decomposition of DLNPI: Model B-FD2
 Period S.E. DLNPI DLNINF DLNPGDP DR DLNFD2
 1  0.111371  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.134236  70.59143  12.47682  0.038478  15.53199  1.361280
 3  0.137751  67.04588  15.11256  0.149176  15.75905  1.933336
 4  0.139147  66.73769  14.82891  0.782973  15.52096  2.129465
 5  0.139750  66.77630  14.85455  0.790853  15.38871  2.189593
 6  0.139950  66.64188  14.96127  0.790099  15.42208  2.184673
 7  0.139992  66.60480  14.98001  0.791385  15.43548  2.188322
 8  0.140010  66.60431  14.97613  0.794327  15.43307  2.192163
 9  0.140019  66.60358  14.97733  0.794818  15.43141  2.192866
 10  0.140022  66.60177  14.97888  0.794796  15.43176  2.192788
 Variance Decomposition of DLNPI: Model B-FD3
 Period S.E. DLNPI DLNINF DLNPGDP DR DLNFD3
 1  0.113117  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.132713  73.91439  8.857569  0.283118  16.86352  0.081402
 3  0.137096  69.90781  9.850386  0.284117  17.15470  2.802990
 4  0.139309  68.45069  9.871808  0.564892  16.61792  4.494690
 5  0.139943  67.95800  10.25433  0.565699  16.48073  4.741239
 6  0.140037  67.87165  10.34304  0.572337  16.47663  4.736345
 7  0.140066  67.86658  10.33949  0.577291  16.47040  4.746241
 8  0.140079  67.85956  10.34367  0.578136  16.46838  4.750247
 9  0.140082  67.85689  10.34636  0.578120  16.46852  4.750106
 10  0.140083  67.85654  10.34638  0.578234  16.46845  4.750396
 
Variance Decomposition of DLNPI: Model B-FD4
 Period S.E. DLNPI DLNINF DLNPGDP DR DLNFD4
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 1  0.111575  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.135002  69.47911  12.06639  0.130478  16.39682  1.927210
 3  0.139053  65.95623  15.14679  0.157194  16.91693  1.822856
 4  0.139725  65.97560  15.04366  0.358112  16.75737  1.865255
 5  0.139963  65.89605  15.07943  0.370389  16.77625  1.877879
 6  0.140040  65.82322  15.12762  0.370459  16.80167  1.877024
 7  0.140055  65.81694  15.13298  0.371933  16.80126  1.876882
 8  0.140058  65.81719  15.13232  0.372470  16.80084  1.877178
 9  0.140060  65.81617  15.13292  0.372480  16.80122  1.877210
 10  0.140060  65.81589  15.13313  0.372491  16.80129  1.877201
 Variance Decomposition of DLNPI: Model B-FDindex
 Period S.E. DLNPI DLNINF DLNPGDP DR
 1  0.112972  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  0.133776  72.90162  10.08486  0.190314  16.60307  0.220144
 3  0.137682  69.28895  12.04079  0.179788  16.82740  1.663077
 4  0.139539  68.46558  11.86915  0.484045  16.41971  2.761518
 5  0.140144  68.19073  12.10474  0.483038  16.27832  2.943173
 6  0.140245  68.09424  12.19810  0.488077  16.27891  2.940671
 7  0.140275  68.08200  12.19796  0.491548  16.27659  2.951904
 8  0.140291  68.07689  12.19878  0.492549  16.27285  2.958937
 9  0.140296  68.07403  12.20180  0.492521  16.27223  2.959425
 10  0.140296  68.07341  12.20225  0.492605  16.27227  2.959468
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Appendix-ii
MODEL A Impulse Response Analysis
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MODEL B Impulse Response Analysis1 
1 In this analysis “invy” , “pinvy” , “pery” are used instead of “I”, “PI”, PGDP” respectively. 
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Model A – FD2
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  0.84739  0.36359
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  4.02848  0.05251
  DLNFD2 does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  0.66461  0.42045
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNFD2  1.04756  0.31309
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  1.48965  0.23043
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DR  0.10038  0.75326
  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  1.44872  0.23681
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  0.43703  0.51289
 
Model A – FD3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  0.84739  0.36359
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  4.02848  0.05251
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  1.48965  0.23043
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DR  0.10038  0.75326
  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  1.44872  0.23681
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  0.43703  0.51289
  DLNFD3 does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  1.41139  0.24282
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNFD3  0.35330  0.55608
Model A – FD4
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  0.84739  0.36359
Appendix-iii
MODEL A Granger Causality Results
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  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  4.02848  0.05251
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  1.48965  0.23043
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DR  0.10038  0.75326
  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  1.44872  0.23681
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  0.43703  0.51289
  DLNFD4 does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  0.10555  0.74720
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNFD4  0.59435  0.44591
 
Model A – FDindex
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  0.84739  0.36359
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  4.02848  0.05251
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  1.48965  0.23043
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DR  0.10038  0.75326
  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  1.44872  0.23681
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  0.43703  0.51289
  DLNFDINDEX does not Granger Cause DLNI 38  2.10028  0.15617
  DLNI does not Granger Cause DLNFDINDEX  0.51455  0.47793
 
MODEL B Granger Causality Results
Model B– FD1
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNFD1 does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.04863  0.82674
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNFD1  0.52332  0.47424
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  4.31446  0.04519
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  3.04715  0.08965
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  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.64549  0.42715
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  2.09254  0.15692
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  13.4414  0.00081
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DR  0.63531  0.43079
 
Model B – FD2
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  4.31446  0.04519
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  3.04715  0.08965
  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.64549  0.42715
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  2.09254  0.15692
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  13.4414  0.00081
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DR  0.63531  0.43079
  DLNFD2 does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.99414  0.32558
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNFD2  0.00598  0.93880
 
Model B – FD3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  4.31446  0.04519
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  3.04715  0.08965
  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.64549  0.42715
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  2.09254  0.15692
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  13.4414  0.00081
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DR  0.63531  0.43079
  DLNFD3 does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.00060  0.98052
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNFD3  1.32403  0.25767
 
Model B– FD4
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  4.31446  0.04519
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  3.04715  0.08965
  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.64549  0.42715
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  2.09254  0.15692
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  13.4414  0.00081
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DR  0.63531  0.43079
  DLNFD4 does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.04707  0.82950
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNFD4  0.03570  0.85122
 
Model B– FDindex
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  DLNINF does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  4.31446  0.04519
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNINF  3.04715  0.08965
  DLNPGDP does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.64549  0.42715
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNPGDP  2.09254  0.15692
  DR does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  13.4414  0.00081
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DR  0.63531  0.43079
  DLNFDINDEX does not Granger Cause DLNPI 38  0.04343  0.83612
  DLNPI does not Granger Cause DLNFDINDEX  0.88874  0.35228
 
